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Introduction
Affirmative action programs in the public and private sector, that is,
positive efforts to recruit members of underrepresented groups in Ameri-
can society to positions long closed to them, have been surrounded by
great controversy for more than a decade. Advocates of such programs
-have asserted that they are ameliorative and benign in nature while op-
ponents label such efforts "reverse discrimination" and ascribe to them a
quota mentality which is viewed as objectionable and unconstitutional.
The problems raised are clearly most dramatic when affirmative action
is taken by the government itself because, from the perspective of the
program's advocates, it is in the governmental sector that the conse-
quences of institutionalized discrimination are most graphic. Concur-
rently, however, the opponents of such programs are bound to perceive
governmental involvement as the heart of the constitutional questions
that are being raised.
* An earlier draft of this article was presented at the 1982 Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association in Denver, Colorado. The research upon which this
paper is based was generously supported with grants from the Social and Behavioral Science
Research Committee of The Ohio State University and The Ohio State University Small
Research Grant Program. I wish to thank the staff of the Senate Judiciary Committee during
the 96th Congress for their aid and support in this project. Debts are especially owed to
Nancy Dalton, Megan McGrath, Sally Schwartz, Elaine Shocas, and Tom Susman. Much
gratitude is also owed to Professor Sheldon Goldman who has shared with me much of his
data on judicial nominees during the Carter Administration which form the basis for much of
the analysis of this paper. Just as importantly, I would like to thank Professor Goldman for
the encouragement and support he has offered throughout the larger research project of
which this paper represents one part. Debts are also owed to Professors Stephen Wasby,
Lawrence Baum, and Lawrence Herson whose comments on an earlier draft of this
manuscript have, I think, made this a' better piece. Thanks also go to Carrie Russell and
Laurie Tishkoff for their aid in coding the data. Finally, I wish to thank Samuel Tyus for his
excellent preparation of the manuscript.
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Affirmative Action
Most debate over affirmative action programs has been polemical in
tone with a dominant focus on the compatibility (or lack thereof) be-
tween such programs and concern with "merit" as the basis for individ-
ual advancement in American society. For many reasons, the federal
judiciary has been an especially prominent subject of the debate. For
one, the federal bench has historically been one of the strongest bastions
of white male dominance in American society. Indeed, when President
Carter took office in 1977 only 22 blacks or Hispanics and 6 women sat
among the more than 500 active federal jurists.' A second reason for
widespread focus on the federal bench was the passage of the Omnibus
Judgeship Act of 1978 which created 152 new federal judgeships (117
district and 35 appeals court positions) and alerted many groups and
interests to the possibility that these vacancies could be part of an effort
to redress past discrimination and move toward a more representative
judicial branch. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the focus on
the judiciary corresponded to an announced pursuit of affirmative ac-
tion by the Carter Administration in the filling of federal judgeships.
The purpose of this article is to examine affirmative action and judi-
cial recruitment during the Carter Administration. What justifications'
were utilized in the call for affirmative action and what criticisms were
levelled against the affirmative action effort? How was affirmative ac-
tion defined by the Carter Administration and what implications did
affirmative action have for nomination outcomes? Did affirmative ac-
tion "dilute" the quality of the federal bench (as critics of the Carter
effort claimed) or, alternatively, did threshold requirements for the ap-
pointment of "non-traditional" (that is, non-white or female) judges ac-
tually exceed, on some dimensions, the apparent criteria for white male
appointees? In order to examine these and other questions, data on all
judicial nominees whose names were sent to the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee for a confirmation hearing during the 96th Congress will be
analyzed.
2
1. Lipshutz & Huron, Achieving a More Representative FederalJudiciary, 62 JUDICATURE 483
(1979).
2. The data base for this research consists primarily of the responses to a Senate Judiciary
Committee questionnaire administered to all judicial nominees during the 96th Congress.
Completion of the questionnaire was required before a nomination hearing would be held on
a candidate and, therefore, before any appointment could be finalized on the Senate floor.
The detailed questionnaires contain a wealth of comparable data on nominees of a kind pre-
viously difficult if not impossible to obtain. Questionnaire responses are likely to result in an
unusually valid data source on appointees since they constituted a record, submitted under
oath, on which members of the Judiciary Committee, the Senate, the press, other interested
parties, and the general public would scrutinize a nominee. Questionnaire data was supple-
mented by additional variables graciously provided by Professor Sheldon Goldman.
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Justifications for Affrmative Action in Judicial Recruitment
The primary justification for affirmative action in judicial selection is
the need for amelioration of long standing underrepresentation of sev-
eral elements of American society on the federal bench. As asserted by
Goldman, "It does not seem unreasonable to make special efforts to re-
cruit from these groupings of Americans for federal judgeships" as long
as race and sex are not utilized in an invidious fashion. 3 In the eyes of
the Carter Administration, the reasons which lay behind the contempo-
rary imbalance on the federal bench were irrelevant. Rather, they were
simply concerned with the reality of an underrepresentative judicial
branch. Thus, according to two Carter advisors, "It accomplishes little
to speculate whether these figures reflected a pattern of discrimination
in the selection process or general societal factors which had in the past
limited the pool of minority and female candidates. Instead, the Presi-
dent. . . simply recognized the existence of a problem which needed to
be addressed."
'4
While redress of past and continuing representational wrongs can
serve as a primary justification for affirmative action policies, it is im-
portant to note that its advocates anticipate that positive benefits will
accrue to the American system of justice from increased diversity on the
bench. A more pluralistic judiciary, for example, would be "more likely
to win the confidence of the diverse groupings in a pluralistic society."5
In a similar vein the Washington Post editorialized, "The strength of the
judiciary rests in the way it is perceived by those over whom it sits in
judgement. That perception will be infinitely better if the bench is
populated with well-qualified men and women of all races. . . than if it
is populated only by the 'best' qualified lawyers, particularly if most of
them turn out to be white males."
'6
Such justifications for affirmative action rely heavily on the likely im-
pact of a more representative bench on public perceptions and confi-
dence. It is also argued, however, that increased representation of
minorities and women would sharpen the judiciary's sensitivity to the
complex substantive issues and controversial social issues facing it. 7 In-
deed the presence and perspective of non-traditional judges would likely
3. Goldman, Should There be Afm5natioe Action for the Judicia y?, 62 JUDICATURE 488, 489
(1979).
4. Lipshutz & Huron, supra note 1, at 483.
5. Goldman, A tQofle of Carter's Judiial Nominees, 62 JUDICATURE 246, 253 (1978).
6. Wash. Post, Jan. 4, 1979, at A24, col. 1.
7. Thus, according to Goldman, "A judge who is a member of a racial minority or a
woman cannot help but bring to the bench a certain sensitivity-indeed, certain qualities of
the heart and mind--that may be particularly helpful in dealing with these issues ...




increase the sensitivities of already seated white male colleagues in ways
which could have a considerably greater impact on the judicial process
than the direct contribution of the new judges.
Thus, justifications offered for affirmative action in judicial recruit-
ment go well beyond the recognition of past discrimination and a cur-
rent representational imbalance. Rather, affirmative action efforts are
seen as instrumental in assuring a bench which fosters greater public
confidence and which is sensitive to the diverse perspectives necessary
for a "just" judiciary. Ultimately, advocates of affirmative action would
contend that such a policy is not inconsistent with "merit" recruitment
but, rather, actually helps to foster a more meritorious bench. From this
perspective, perhaps, the debate over affirmative action may be reduced
to a debate over the questions of how merit is to be defined and whose
definition of merit is to prevail.
Critci'sms of Affirmative Action in Judicial Recruitment
In direct opposition to the advocates' position, critics of affirmative
action programs (including those focusing on the implications of such
programs in the judicial selection arena) contend that there is a basic
and inherent contradiction between affirmative action and appointment-
of the most qualified individuals.
The precepts of merit selection dictate that only those possessing the most
illustrious credentials will be recommended, without regard to political
considerations. However, it is claimed, affirmative action is, by its nature,
a political goal, and one which directly contravenes the very thrust of
merit selection. It submerges quality in order to redress past race and sex
discrimination.
8
Critics of affirmative action ignore the usefulness of outreach efforts
and expanded search processes as a means of locating qualified individ-
uals that traditional search procedures miss. They contend that such
programs amount to the granting of absolute preference to individual
members of underrepresented groups-even when other considerations
are not in any sense equal. Berkson and Carbon cite instances in the
operation of President Carter's U.S. Circuit Judge Nominating Com-
mission where it appears that panel members did bend over backwards
to advance the candidacies of individuals they themselves did not feel
were sufficiently qualified on the record presented.
Some who seemed to be questionable choices on paper were invited on the
norities and women cannot help but add a new dimension of justice to our courts .
Goldman, supra note 3, at 494.
8. L. BERKSON & S. CARBON, THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE NOMINATING COM-
MISSION: ITS MEMBERS, PROCEDURES, AND CANDIDATES 4 (1980).
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theory that one's qualifications are not always fully reflected in a written
application.
Some women and minorities were interviewed by at least one panel
whose members did not believe they were sufficiently qualified to warrant
an interview.
9
Clearly, such an approach did not sit well with some Senators.
We're happy to see affirmative action in the Commission's reaching out to
solicit applications and, hopefully, they will turn out to be well qualified.
If, however, there is any hint of using balance in an attempt to preserve
ratios and dilute the strength of the bench this would be opposed. Out-
reach is great, but don't put people in spots where they don't belong. This
is the standard conservative view on affirmative action.' 0
Sheldon Goldman has catalogued six major objections to affirmative
action in federal judicial selection." These objections can be briefly
summarized as follows:
1. The dangers of classi'ing people-Inherent dangers exist in the classifica-
tion of people based upon racial or comparable characteristics. Such
classifications run counter to American values and do not allow for the
treatment of individuals according to their personal worth.
2. The threat of reverse dircrnmination--When government offers favorable
treatment to one group, it is disfavoring another.
3. The error offocusing on group aftdiation-Affirmative action policies do not
focus on individual merit but, rather, offer preference to individuals
based on their group affiliation.
4. The need for governmental neutrality, not favoritism -Proven constitutional
wrongs necessitate the removal of barriers and burdens which led to
past discrimination. It is appropriate for government to end discrimi-
nation; it is inappropriate to foster favoritism.
5. The problem of quotas-Affirmative action leads to quota systems which
are inherently at odds with American values and serve to advantage
the relatively less deserving.
6. An inappropriate program for the judciaiy-While affirmative action may
be appropriate in other spheres of American life it has no place in the
judicial system because of its unique needs and functions.'
2
The central focus for criticism of affirmative action programs has
been placed on the "problem of quotas." Clearly, quota mentalities are
9. Id. at 80.
10. Slotnick, Reforms inJudiidal Selection- Will they Afct the Senator's Role?, 64 JUDICATURE
114, 117 (1980).
11. Goldman, supra note 3, at 489-94.
12. Critics might contend that Goldman, as an advocate of affirmative action, levels a
strawman argument against it. For formulations by critics of affirmative action see N.
GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY (1975)
and B. GROSS, DISCRIMINATION IN REVERSE: Is TURNABOUT FAIR PLAY? (1978). For other
efforts to illuminate the complex issues implicated by the affirmative action debate see B.





inconsistent with the American ethic and the mere suggestion of their
usage can serve as a rallying cry for the development of an emotional
and active opposition. As Virginia Senator Harry Byrd asserted during
a protracted battle over a potential black nominee for the U.S. District
Court, "I can't imagine anything worse for the American people than to
have a quota system for federal judges."' 3 Similar senatorial perspec-
tives on the utilization of quotas emerged in recent research. As one
Democratic Senator noted, "It is not our responsibility to guarantee any
fixed percentage of different classes of people. You try to get the best
qualified people, not some elusive balance." Similarly, an aide to a con-
servative southern Republican added, "Race or sex has nothing to do
with it. Carter has gone too far in trying to impose quotas. The whole
approach is off base. . . . We like the principle of merit selection. We
applaud that. . . . Yet are they doing that?"'
4
Thus, the tensions between merit and affirmative action are present in
the assertions of both supporters and critics of efforts to increase repre-
sentativeness on the federal bench. At times, however, it appears that
the debators cannot even agree on what the nature of the Carter Admin-
istration's affirmative action effort was and how that effort should be
defined. In part, this may be because of mixed signals from the Admin-
istration itself. It is to an attempt to define the Carter Administration's
affirmative action policy in judicial recruitment that we now turn.
Defining the Carter Affrmative Action Effort
The basic premises which guided the Carter Administration's activi-
ties with regard to increasing the representativeness of the federal bench
were rooted in the belief that in a pluralist democracy the diversity
among the ruled should be reflected in similar diversity among the rul-
ers. In effect, the Administration's goals were "based on the belief that
the governing institutions of a democracy should reflect the spectrum of
interests of the governed and that this is done by dispersing the power to
govern among representatives of diverse groups. In short, it is assumed
that a national judiciary should resemble its national demographic con-
stituency. Therefore, large groups which have been denied extensive
representation in government should now be given a greater degree of
representation. These values cannot be tested and confirmed or refuted.
One can only accept or reject them."
15
13. Wash. Post, Apr. 10, 1980, at AI, col. 2.
14. Slotnick, supra note 10, at 117.
15. A. NEFF, THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE NOMINATING COMMISSION: THEIR
MEMBERS, PROCEDURES, AND CANDIDATES 150 (1981).
275
Yale Law & Policy Review
The official thrust of the President's affirmative action program was
revealed in two executive orders; one issued on May 10, 1978 in which
the President issued a mandate to his new U.S. Circuit Judge Nominat-
ing Commission and the other issued on November 8, 1978 establishing
"standards and guidelines" for the appointment of district judges under
the Omnibus Judgeship Act. In the initial executive order the President
underlined the need for the advisory circuit panels to cast a wide net in
seeking candidates and they were encouraged "to make special efforts to
• . .identify well qualified women and members of minority groups as
potential nominees." 16 The later order instructed the Attorney General,
before recommending candidates to the President, to consider whether
"an affirmative effort has been made, in the case of each vacancy, to
identify candidates, including women and members of minority
groups."
17
Although the wording of the executive orders emphasized expanding
outreach efforts, the commitment being articulated may have also ex-
tended to representative outcomes from the judicial selection process.
Indeed, outside of the confines of the executive orders the President and
his representatives left little doubt where they stood. As early as July,
1977, Margaret McKenna, the Deputy Assistant for the White House
Office of Legal Counsel, told the Federal Judicial Nominating Commis-
sion Workshop of the President's "firm commitment to affirmative ac-
tion in the judicial selection process and his concern that the panels...
find and recruit minority groups and nontraditional candidates for the
federal bench." '18 Similarly, on August 5, 1978, Associate Attorney Gen-
eral Michael Egan, the key Justice Department official dealing with ju-
dicial nominations, told the American Bar Association Symposium on
Merit Selection of Federal Judges that the Administration "is deter-
mined to broaden the bench and add a significant number of women
and minorities."' 9 On signing the Omnibus Judgeship Act on October
20, 1978, the President himself asserted, "This act provides a unique
opportunity to begin to redress another disturbing feature of the Federal
judiciary: the almost complete absence of women or members of minor-
ity groups. . .I am committed to these appointments, and pleased that
this act recognizes that we need more than token representation on the
Federal bench."
'20
16. Exec. Order No. 12,059,3C.F.R. 180 (1979),notedin 28 U.S.C. § 44 at 6 (Supp. 1981).
17. Exec. Order No. 12,097, 3 C.F.R. 254 (1979),reprintd in 28 U.S.C. § 133 at 17 (Supp.
1981).
18. BERKSON & CARBON, .upra note 8, at 34.
19. Id




Ranging quite afar from the simple outreach effort suggested by the
words in the President's official executive orders, Attorney General
Bell's posture before the Senate Judiciary Committee on January 25,
1979, revealed the Administration's commitment to representative out-
comes from selection processes.
I perceive my role as that of being an honest broker . .. I think I have a
duty to seek out and find qualified people of all types and give the names
to the senators. . . .And I think I have a duty, and this is a painful one,
to say to a senator I wish you would reconsider your list. . . . We are
pledged to make the judicial system more representative and I wish you
would reconsider."
2 '
At the hearing the Attorney General also made it clear that "qualified"
was the bottom line requirement for the appointment of women and
minorities to the bench-even if there were more highly qualified white
male candidates under consideration as well. At bottom, Bell "believed
. . .that choices of that sort had to be made to alter the composition of
the bench in meaningful quantities.
'2 2
Needless to say, the asserted policy was quite controversial and fanned
the debate over the implications of affirmative action for competent
"merit" appointments. Making matters worse, the feared quota mental-
ity had made its way into the White House itself. Thus, President
Carter told one black reporter of his goal "to have black judges in Geor-
gia, Florida, the Carolinas, Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, indeed
throughout the country." 23 And in what was, perhaps, a more ill-consid-
ered statement the President asserted, "If I didn't have to get Senate
confirmation of appointees, I could just tell you flatly that 12 percent of
all my judicial appointments would be black and 3 percent would be
Spanish-speaking and 40 percent would be women, and so forth."
'24
Did Affrmative Action Really Exist?: Some Perspectives
Thus far, we have considered justifications for affirmative action in
judicial recruitment as well as several criticisms aimed at such pr6grams.
An effort has also been made to define the scope and meaning of the
Carter administration's affirmative action policies. It is notable, how-
ever, that all of the perspectives which we have considered, whether sup-
portive or critical of affirmative action, have started from the premise
21. Slotnick, The Changing Role of the SenateJudiciay Committee injudicial Selection, 62 JUDI-
CATURE 502, 503 (1979).
22. NEFF, supra note 15, at 102.
23. As quoted in BERKSON & CARBON, supra note 8, at 34.
24. Hanchette, Few Minorities Sit on Federal Bench, Gannett News Service, 1979, appearing
in Gannett News Service Special Report: Justi.c on Trial, at 5, col. 2 (may be obtained from
Gannett News Service Dept. 1-800-368-3553).
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that an affirmative action program did exist and was implemented in the
judicial selection arena during the Carter presidency. It is important to
underline that this premise is not shared by all the prospective benefi-
ciaries of the Carter effort-judgeship candidates who were women
and/or non-white. Rather, some women and minority group members
argue that far from lowering the standards to be met by non-traditional
nominees, the operation of the judicial selection process actually estab-
lished barriers and substantially higher threshold requirements to be
met by potential female and/or non-white candidates before they would
be given serious consideration.
Perhaps the most controversial requirements which were imposed on
nominees and often criticized because of their alleged discriminatory
impact were those which mandated that except under unusual circum-
stances candidates would not be nominated with less than 12-15 years of
legal experience or if they were over 60 years of age. 2 5 The chief objec-
tion was that non-traditional candidates have relatively less legal experi-
ence and that the nature of their experience differs substantially from
what is generally considered necessary. As noted by Assistant Attorney
General Barbara Babcock, a key figure in the Carter effort to search for
qualified non-traditional candidates, "[W]omen lawyers do not have the
same kind of resumes men do. They've been kept from being president
of the local bar association. They don't make partner in the firm as fast,
either."
26
Elaine Jones of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund
argued before the Senate Judiciary Committee that a mechanically im-
posed experience requirement would bar from the bench many who had
a range of experience which would make them ideal candidates. Ulti-
mately, implementing the Carter criteria "would serve to perpetuate in
the judicial selection process the prior exclusion of minorities from the
profession as a whole. The rule would thus serve to eliminate from our
already too few numbers many who are in every respect qualified- 12 to
15 years is no magic number. . . wherein, magically, one becomes ex-
perienced. One lawyer may practice . . .with shining mediocrity for
years too numerous to count, while another can demonstrate superb skill
25. The problems raised, outlined below regarding potential black nominees, are applica-
ble to all minorities and women:
[T]he pool remains relatively small in the mid-career age range. . . . Few blacks at-
tended law schools before or during the early 1960's. . .[a]nd few have had opportuni-
ties to gain the kind of experience the Supplemental Instructions require: handling
"complicated legal problems," doing "legal scholarship and writing," engaging in both
trial and appellate work and working with federal law.
Fish, Evaluating Ite Black Judital Applicant, 62 JUDICATURE 495, 497 (1979).




and ability in a mere few years."'27 At the same committee hearing,
David Cohen of Common Cause underlined that it was the nature of
one's legal experience and not its duration which was of importance.
Further, Cohen suggested, the reputed differences in the legal experi-
ence of candidates who were not white males were virtues and not liabili-
ties. "There is no. . .one type of service that prepares a person to be a
good judge. The varied experience of public defenders, legal services
attorneys, and civil rights lawyers would strengthen our Federal judici-
ary. The issues before the Federal courts span the breadth of our soci-
ety. The legal experience of our judges should stretch as far."' 28
A particular concern of those fearful of the discriminatory impact of
the Carter guidelines for nominees was the issue of whether non-tradi-
tional candidates (particularly blacks) could withstand traditional scru-
tiny into their criminal records, integrity, and judicial temperament. As
noted by Elaine Jones:
[U]nder the guidelines. . . conviction of a misdemeanor other than a mi-
nor traffic violation is a disqualifying factor. This . . . overlooks the fact
that this country went through a civil rights revolution in the sixties and
many black men and women who subsequently went to law school have
misdemeanor convictions for disturbance of the peace, criminal trespass
and other violations growing out of the civil rights movement which are
still of record.
29
The fear even existed that a record of civil rights activism would be
treated as a disqualifying factor.
We do not wish a system of selection which penalizes people who have
fought vigorously over the years to enforce the Constitution. . . . [E]very
precaution must be taken to assure that minorities who have been on the
firing line are not being excluded. . . by arguments discretely couched in
terms of judicial temperament. 3
0
While non-traditional judgeship candidates (particularly blacks) may
have functioned professionally as "legal servants" meeting the daily
needs of the black community or "legal militants" litigating equal pro-
tection cases against the dominant power structure, 3' the other side of
the experiential coin suggests that they are relatively less likely to have
gained prior judicial experience than their white, male counterparts.
Such a reality, it was feared, would continue to work against non-tradi-
tional candidates.
27. Selection and Confimation of Federal Judges: Hearing Before the Committee on the Judici
UnitedStates Senate, Part 1, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 68-69 (1979) (statement of Elaine R. Jones).
28. Id at 65 (statement of David Cohen).
29. Id at 69 (statement of Elaine R. Jones).
30. Id
31. Fish, supra note 25, at 497-98.
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Our numbers are already small; and to heap an additional requirement
such as judicial experience on those numbers virtually assures that nonpar-
ticipation of minorities in any significant way in the selection process. The
impact on minorities of such a requirement . . .is exclusion.
32
Indeed, it was even suggested by Susan Ness of the National Women's
Political Caucus that, at least in the early days of the Carter Adminis-
tration, a double standard was utilized to gauge the importance of judi-
cial experience in potential nominees. That is, such experience
appeared to be a threshold requirement for non-traditional nominees
but not for white males.
33
Our examination of affirmative action and judicial recruitment dur-
ing the Carter Administration reveals a policy program which was the
subject of much debate, controversy, and disagreement. Supporters, op-
ponents and analysts of the Carter effort failed to agree on the impact
and implications of this effort. One thing, however, does remain clear.
Recruitment outcomes during the Carter Administration resulted in a
more "representative" bench than had ever existed if the concept of rep-
resentation is assessed by the sheer number and percentage of appoin-
tees who were not white males. Of Carter's 262 district and appeals
court appointees 40 were women, 38 were black, and 16 were Hispanics
(7 of the black and 1 of the Hispanic nominees were women). This con-
stituted a greater number of non-traditional appointees that had been
designated over the course of the nation's entire history and, clearly, was
an obvious departure from the selection behavior of recent Presidents.
As noted by Goldman, "By the end of the Carter Administration the
proportion of women judges on the federal bench had risen from one per
cent to close to seven per cent and, for blacks, from four per cent to close
to nine per cent."
'34
Those figures, however, tell only part of the story. Clearly, the debate
over affirmative action has never focused solely on the actual possibility
of substantially increasing the numbers of individuals from under-
represented groups in important positions in American society. Rather,
controversy generally surrounded the issue of what the implications of
greater representativeness were for the quality of American institu-
tions-with the judicial branch being simply one example.
Aftinnatve Action and the Charactentics ofJudgeshtp Nomtnees
As we have seen, many assertions and much rhetoric have character-
32. Jones, supra note 27, at 69.
33. Ness, The Bench. Where Are All the Women, L.A. Times, Apr. 4, 1978, pt. II, at 5, col. 3.




ized the debate over affirmative action. Little, if any, empirical re-
search, however, has explored the consequences of recruitment outreach
for the quality of the American bench. Clearly, "quality" is an elusive
concept-particularly when society remains ambivalent about what
constitutes a "good" judge. Nevertheless, it is possible to compare and
contrast non-traditional nominees with their white male counterparts in
terms of certain background characteristics, some of which are thought
to be related to judicial performance. How do women, and Hispanic
nominees differ from the traditional white males nominated at the same
time? Can the judgement reasonably be made that non-traditional
nominees were "inferior" candidates? On the other hand, is there any
evidence which suggests that higher threshold qualifications were im-
posed before non-traditional candidates could successfully emerge from
the recruitment process? The remainder of this article will focus on an-
swering these questions by using data collected on all judicial nominees
whose names were sent to the Senate Judiciary Committee for confirma-
tion hearings during the 96th Congress. Our analysis will compare
white male and non-traditional nominees on several dimensions includ-
ing their demographic profiles, educational achievement, level of
politicization, legal career patterns, and litigation records. 35 The analy-
sis is exploratory in nature. Since advocates and opponents of affirma-
tive action programs differ so fundamentally on what their
consequences will be, no effort has been made to develop formal hypoth-
eses about the differences between white male and all other nominees.
Demographic Backgrounds-Presumably, the most graphic consequences of
affirmative action in judicial recruitment would be evident in the demo-
graphic and socio-economic profiles of nominees. At the most obvious
level, nominations during the Carter years revealed a proliferation of
what we have labelled "non-traditional" judgeship candidates-that is,
nominees who were not white males. The larger question remains, how-
ever, of whether increased representation of minorities on the bench ac-
tually resulted in a more "representative" judiciary in substantively
meaningful ways. Our data on several demographic and socio-economic
variables do suggest a variety of differences between white male and
non-traditional nominees which go well beyond simple considerations of
race and gender.
35. Our concept of non-traditional nominees is a broad one including al! women, blacks,
and Hispanics. Consequently, an effort will be made to break down the category into its
component parts when such an operation significantly affects our analysis. Similarly, the
analysis will generally be conducted together for district and appeals court nominees. When
controlling for court level significantly alters our findings this, too, will be reported.
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The strongest demographic and socio-economic differences between
white male and other nominees emerged in age and income. As Table 1
shows, non-white and women nominees were significantly younger and
were found disproportionately in lower income brackets than their white
male counterparts. 36 A clear majority of non-traditional nominees
(62.1%) were under the age of 50 as compared to 38.7% of the white
males. Twice as great a percentage of white male nominees were over
the age of 60 at the time of their nomination. In addition to and, per-
haps, reflecting these age differences, non-traditional nominees tended
to have substantially lower incomes. Fully 25.0% of the white males
averaged more than $100,000 per year income during the five year inter-
val prior to their appointment, while the corresponding figure was only
8.8% for non-traditional designates. A clear majority (60.2%) of the
non-traditional nominees earned less than $60,000 per annum prior to
their judgeship nomination while the corresponding figure was substan-
tially lower (43.5%) for white males. Importantly, such income differ-
ences reflect more than simply the aggregate age (and, presumably,
career stage) differences among nominees. Rather, as will be developed,
they appear to reflect different career patterns and professional exper-
iences characterizing the two classes of appointees.
Other demographic and socio-economic differences among the nomi-
nees are also of some, although less dramatic, note. For one, non-tradi-
tional nominees were considerably more likely to be born outside of the
state or circuit in which their appointment was made (38.2%) than were
their white male counterparts (24.3%). Tau B = -0.15, Significance =
0.02). This finding, however, was largely the result of gender based dif-
ferences in birthplace (Tau B = 0.20, Significance = 0.00), with 51.7% of
all female nominees born outside of the state or circuit of their appoint-
ment. The data support the view that local roots could facilitate access
to the federal bench. While the argument could be made that extended
search efforts were necessary to locate suitable women nominees and
often resulted in candidacies of non-local lineage, such an assertion fails
to explain the absence of differences in the birthplaces of whites and
non-whites where a similar search is presumably needed. More to the
point, we may speculate that the legal careers of the successful women
nominees evidenced greater geographic mobility than that of the white
36. For this and all future relationships discussed, unless otherwise indicated, a relation-
ship significant at p 5 .05 will be treated as statistically significant. Contingency coefficients
are utilized in the few instances where variables were measured at the nominal level. For
ordinally measured variables, Tau B was utilized for "square" tables with equal numbers of
rows of columns. Tau C was used for "rectangular" tables with unequal numbers of rows and
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males since the women's careers may have been more closely linked to
the geographic mobility of their spouses. Presumably, the males could
more easily pursue career opportunities closer to home and, therefore,
would have access to the less difficult path to a judgeship. 3
7
In sum, the socioeconomic and demographic data reveal that the dif-
ferences between white male judicial nominees of the Carter Adminis-
tration and non-traditional candidates went well beyond the obvious
race and sex differences. Non-white men and women nominees added
greatly to the representation on the bench of younger segments and of
those with relatively lower incomes. These findings suggest numerous
differences between white male and non-traditional nominees which will
be explored throughout the remainder of this article. The data supports
the argument made by the advocates of affirmative action that such a
policy would lead to the creation of a more representative judiciary on
many scores.
Educational Backgrounds-Since advocates and opponents of affirmative
action differ markedly in their assertions about the consequences of such
programs for meritorious advancement, one would expect them to have
different expectations concerning how white male and non-traditional
judicial nominees would fare on possible measures of their qualifica-
tions. Presumably one dimension of "quality" in judges is their educa-
tional training and attainments. Critics of affirmative action contend
that those advanced through such programs received inferior educations
which would result in inferior judicial performance. Advocates of af-
firmative action, however, assert that non-traditional candidates are the
equals of white males in their professional training. Indeed, they argue
that the non-traditional candidate generally required better educational
credentials than white males in their professional training to cross the
threshold of recruitment discrimination. 38 Our analysis focused on sev-
eral variables to compare the educational backgrounds of white male
and non-traditional candidates. These included information about the
college and law school the nominees attended, where they went to law
school (in or out of the state or circuit of their appointment), and
whether or not they received law school honors during their professional
training.
39
37. Completing our consideration of demographic and socio-economic variables, there
were no significant relationships between the nominees' religious preferences and their race or
gender.
38. For a broad range of views concerning the expectations critics and advocates have for
the implementation and consequences of affirmative action programs see, generally, the
sources cited in Goldman, jupra note 3. Sealso Slotnick, supra note 10; Slotnick, supra note 21.




In the aggregate there were no statistically significant differences be-
tween white male and non-traditional nominees in any of these measures
of educational background and achievement. In examining the educa-
tional backgrounds of nominees, however, the argument could reason-
ably be made that our non-traditional nominee status is too broad in its
inclusion of all non-white and female candidates and that important
differences among the groups are subsumed in the categorization. In
keeping with this view it could be argued that the historical pattern of
disadvantagedness and institutionalized discrimination against blacks in
American educational institutions would be evidenced in lower levels of
educational attainment and fewer graduates of elite law schools for non-
white candidates. The argument, however, might run somewhat differ-
ently for women; the successful few might disproportionately emerge
from a relatively advantaged status. Thus, women, more so than non-
whites, could be expected to attend the more prestigious law schools and
further, might be expected to earn a relatively greater percentage of law
school honors than non-white nominees.
To explore these possibilities, additional analysis was performed com-
paring white and non-white nominees and male and female nominees
on our educational measures. The secondary analysis resulted in some
findings which did not emerge from the broad comparison of white male
with all non-traditional judgeship candidates. Thus, as Table 2 reveals,
white nominees were more likely than non-whites to have earned law
school honors and attended elite law schools-tending to bolster the ar-
guments of affirmative action's critics. On the other hand, the data also
supported the "threshold" theory for non-traditional appointees when
applied to women candidates on the same dimension.
The data presented in Table 2 should not obscure the fact that the
affirmative action concept in the context of judicial recruitment applied
with equal force to non-white and women candidates. Historically, the
federal bench has not only been disproportionately white, but dispro-
portionately male as well. From this perspective, in the aggregate, it is
review or law journal, earning Order of the Coif distinction, graduating at the top of one's
class, competing in national moot court competition, etc. Colleges and law schools were char-
acterized as public, private, or Ivy. Law schools were also characterized as "elite" or "less
Elite." A school was considered to be "elite" if it was included on three of the following
measures:
1. The Gourman Report (14 "Distinguished" law schools)
2. Barron's Guide "Group " law schools (14 "high resource" law schools)
3. Blau-Margulies Report (top 9 law schools)
4. Cartter Report (top 15 law schools)
5. Ladd-Lipset Report (top 8 law schools)
6. Juris Doctor (top 13 law schools).
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TABLE 2-Status of Law School Attended and Attainment of Law
School Honors by Race and Gender.
Attainment of
Law School
Status of Law School Honors
ELITE LESS ELITE YES NO
(a) (b)
73 90 62 101
White (44.8%) (55.2%) (38.0%) (62.0%)
Race
14 34 7 41
Non-White (29.2%) (70.8%) (14.6%) (85.4%)
(c) (d)
71 107 53 125
Male (39.9%) (60.1%) (29.8%) (70.2%)
Gender
16 17 16 17
Female (48.5%) (51.5%) (48.5%) (51.5%)
(a) Tau B = 0.13, Significance = 0.03
(b) Tau B = 0.21, Significance = 0.00
(c) Tau B = -0.06, Significance = 0.18
(d) Tau B = -0.14, Significance = 0.02
clear that affirmative action in judicial selection during the Carter ad-
ministration did not dilute the quality of the federal judiciary (or, for
that matter, raise it higher) when the educational backgrounds of non-
traditional nominees are juxtaposed with those of white males. We do
not mean to suggest that the "quality" of a judge is wholly reflected in
his or her educational background. However, educational background
and achievement are frequently issues in debates over the consequences
of affirmative action for the quality of the federal bench.
Poh't'cization-A third set of variables that we examined focused on sev-
eral available measures of a nominee's politicization or political activity
in an effort to assess whether white males differed from all other judge-
ship candidates on these indicators. 4° While our measures of political
40. While virtually all (93.1%) of the nominees during the 96th Congress were Democrats,
it should be noted that non-traditional candidates were more likely to be Independents and
less likely to be Republicans than white male nominees. (Contingency coefficient = 0.23,
Significance = 0.00). Indeed, 9 out of the 10 Republicans nominated were white males and
there were no black Republican nominees. While Republicanism was a clear liability for all
potential candidates, it appeared to be a virtually fatal and insurmountable barrier to the




involvement are somewhat imperfect, they should collectively create a
portrait of the level of political activity of Carter nominees. The vari-
ables utilized included measures of whether the nominees had made any
speeches during the past five years that they characterized as "signifi-
cant," whether they had ever held (through appointment or election) a
public office, whether they had ever played a significant role in a polit-
ical campaign, and whether they had ever been a candidate for a non-
judicial elective office. As Table 3 demonstrates, there is little difference
between white male nominees and non-traditional candidates on the rel-
atively diffuse measures of self-ascribed significant speeches (of unspeci-
fied, open content), and the holding of public office (honorific or
otherwise). When we move to more blatently political activity involving
campaign work and political candidacies the differences between the
white male and non-traditional candidates emerge more strongly.
These patterns are not surprising. Both conventional wisdom and ac-
ademic research have demonstrated the tendency for federal judges to
emerge from among attorneys who "knew" a senator-sometimes as a
campaign worker and sometimes as a fellow candidate.4 1 Political activ-
ism, however, has less often been associated with racial minorities and-
women. Consequently, it has not been as frequently associated with'
their elevation to the bench. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the
differences between white males and non-traditional nominees on
politicization measures are largely the result of gender associated differ-
ences. As Table 4 illustrates, women and men differed significantly on
each of our four politicization measures. Whites and non-whites differed
significantly on none.
Curiously, the gender differences were not all in the expected direc-
tion. Thus, women were more likely to perceive themselves as having
made significant speeches than men. Therefore, this variable may not
be tied solely or predominantly to political activity per se but may in-
clude a broad range of speechmaking in other areas such as charitable,
social, or cultural concerns. On the other politicization measures how-
ever, the gender based differences strikingly demonstrated relatively
lower levels of political activity and involvement by women appointees
than men.
tional candidates are clearly more limited than those for white males. Under such circum-
stances qualified Republicans, particularly among non-whites, might prove virtually
impossible to find.
41. For a description of the role of patronage in federal bench appointments, see H.
CHASE, FEDERAL JUDGES: THE APPOINTING PROCESS (1972); for a more recent view of sena-
torial prerogatives in judicial selection, see Slotnick, supra note 10.
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While the Carter Administration's affirmative action program in judi-
cial recruitment did not depoliticize the federal bench, it did result in
the appointment of greater numbers of judges lacking active political
backgrounds. Analysts have long disagreed about the virtues of having
politically active individuals serving in judicial positions but, thankfully,
that is a debate which need not be entered into here. From the perspec-
tive of assessing the consequences of affirmative action in judicial re-
cruitment it suffices to note that the pattern of lower politicization
characterizing non-traditional nominees emerges as yet another compo-
nent of the increased representativeness such appointees have brought to
the federal bench.
Legal Careers-The most compelling questions surrounding affirmative
action and recruitment to the federal bench, as seen, concern the impli-
cations of such programs for the qualifications and likely performance of
those chosen to serve. Indeed, the pluralist premises behind affirmative
action envision an enrichment of perspectives in judicial decision-mak-
ing as a consequence of increased representation. On the other hand,
critics of affirmative action counter that such an "enrichment" is merely
a euphemism for the lowering of standards and qualifications for those
gaining entree to judgeships.
42
As we have seen, defining "quality" in ajudicial nominee is an elusive
endeavor. Nevertheless, it has proven instructive to juxtapose white
male and non-traditional nominees on dimensions including their demo-
graphic, educational, and politicization profiles. Most central to our
empirical analysis, however, remains the question of how affirmative ac-
tion has altered, if at all, possible paths to federal judgeships. In the
final analysis, has affirmative action made a significant difference in the
types of attorneys raised to the bench when attention is focused on the
professional qualifications and legal careers of the newly appointed?
Numerous indicators were used to examine the legal careers from
which judgeship nominees emerged. Among them were the following:
1. Prior Judicial Experience
2. Prior Prosecutorial Experience
3. Legal Aid or Public Defender Experience
4. Clerking Experience with State Supreme Court Justice, U.S. District
Judge, U.S. Supreme Court Justice
5. Last Job Prior to Nomination
6. Highest Court Before which Nominee has been Admitted to Practice
(State Court, U.S. District Court, U.S. Court of Appeals, U.S.
Supreme Court)
42. See supra note 38.
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Each candidate was also required to provide detailed case studies of
the ten most significant legal matters that they had personally handled
during their careers. Operating on the assumption that those case stud-
ies offered important evidence of how nominees perceived their own ca-
reers, each case Was coded on a number of variables for each nominee.
Summary variables were also created for each nominee based on aggre-
gating the data obtained from the ten case studies. Included were meas-
ures of the percentage of the case studies arising in the federal judiciary,
involving civil law, and reaching appellate courts. Finally, each case
study was also coded according to its subject matter and an attempt was
made to operationalize the concept of a "non-traditional" legal practice
based on the summary aggregation of the case studies for each
nominee.44
Table 5 reveals that our two classes of nominees differed significantly
on some measures of professional experience prior to being nominated to
the federal bench, while they were indistinguisable from each other on
several others. Thus, the likelihood of having served as a prosecutor or a
law clerk did not appear to differ for white male and other candidates.
Dramatic differences emerged, however, when the prior judicial experi-
ence and public defender/legal aid backgrounds of candidates were con-
sidered, with non-traditional candidates more likely to enjoy both such
credentials in their backgrounds. Indeed, less than half of the white
male nominees as compared to approximately two thirds of the non-
traditional candidates had served as judges before their federal appoint-
ment. Equally noteworthy, more than twice as many non-traditional
43. Several items in the Senate Judiciary Committee Candidate questionnaires attempted
to measure a nominee's litigating experience. These included estimates of the frequency of
court appearances, the percentage of a candidate's litigation which occurred in federal, state,
or other courts, and the percentage of a candidate's litigation which involved civil matters
versus criminal concerns.
44. The subject matter codes used to categorize the case studies were as follows: Business
Organization and Management, Contracts, Real Property, Torts, Personal Finances, Family
and Estate, Criminal, and several Public Law categories (Governmental Regulatory Powers,
Prisoner and Defendant Rights, Equal Protection and Abuse of Governmental Authority).
Areas of legal practice categorized as non-traditional in this study were criminal defense,
public law plaintiff (or defendant against governmental regulatory activity), tort plaintiff,
personal finances, and family law. Such practices are, according to conventional wisdom, less
likely to lead to federal judgeships. Nominees who acted in these capacities in at least four of
the ten case studies developed in the questionnaire were considered to have a non-traditional
practice.
Yale Law & Policy Review Vol. 1:270, 1982
Affirmative Action
nominees (48.6%) had served in a public defender-legal aid capacity
than had the white males (23.7%). Further, consideration of the last job
held by nominees prior to their appointment demonstrated that non-
traditional nominees were predominately drawn from the ranks of sit-
ting judges (59.5%). The corresponding figure for white males was only
39.4%. In a similar vein, nearly half (49.6%) of the white males chosen
ascended to the bench from private practice with the corresponding
figure for non-traditional nominees a substantially less robust 25.7%.
When it is added that nearly twice as many non-traditional nominees
(9.5%) held law school professorships immediately prior to their ap-
pointment than white males (5.1%) affirmative action can be seen to
have led to greater diversification of career experiences on the federal
bench. Given the nature of these aggregate career experiences one
would be hard pressed to assert that non-traditional candidates have
diluted the quality of the federal bench. Indeed, it is data such as these
which have led spokespersons for the expansion of the representativeness
of the federal bench to conclude that non-traditional candidates need to
surpass a threshold for appointment consideration placed at a higher
plane than that used to gauge white male candidacies.
4 5
Additional insights are gained when it is noted that some of the differ-
ences found in professional background are most associated with the
patterns revealed by an identifiable segment of the broad non-tradi-
tional nominee category. For example, the tendency for non-traditional
nominees to have have had judicial and public defender/legal aid expe-
rience was more highly associated with racial as opposed to gender dif-
ferences among nominees. On the other hand, while white male and all
other nominees demonstrated no differences regarding their
prosecutorial or law clerking experiences, women were approximately
half as likely to have served as prosecutors than men (Tau B = 0.18,
Significance = 0.00), and non-whites were only about one third as likely
to have gained clerking experience as white nominees (Tau B = -0.17,
Significance = 0.01).
Other professionally oriented measures revealed additional differences
between white male and non-traditional nominees. For one, the white
males evidenced considerably more years of legal experience than other
nominees as portrayed in Table 6. Indeed, only 19% of the white male
nominees had under 20 years of legal experience while nearly half (46%)
of the non-traditional nominees fell into this category. On the other side
of the experiential coin 57.6% of the white males had more than 25 years
to their credit in the legal profession while the figure dropped dramati-
45. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 27; Cohen, supra note 28; Ness, supra note 33.
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cally to 27% for non-traditional nominees. Similarly, white male candi-
dates tend to have been admitted to practice before a "higher" level
court than non-whites and women (Tau C = -0.14, Significance =
0.02). Thus, 57.8% of the white male nominees have been admitted to
practice before the U.S. Supreme Court, and 81.5% have been admitted
to the federal bar at least as high as the circuit court level. The cor-
responding figures for non-traditional candidates are 45.9% and 68.9%
respectively.
TABLE 6-Legal Experience by Nominee Status(a)
Years at Bar
6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 31 +
2 15 17 20 12 8
Non-Traditional (2.7%) (20.3%) (23.0%) (27.0%) (16.2%) (10.8%)
Nominee
Status
0 9 17 32 38 41
White Male (0.0%) (6.6%) (12.4%)(23.4%)(27.7%)(29.9%)
2 24 34 52 50 49
Total (0.9%) (11.4%) (16.1%) (24.6%) (23.7%) (23.2%)
(a) Tau C = 0.36, Significance = 0.00
It should be noted, however, that admission to practice before prestig-
ious courts, such as the U.S. Supreme Court, is often largely honorific-
requiring only a sponsor and the payment of a fee. Perhaps the data
does reflect however, the tendency of the non-traditional nominees not
to share equally in the accoutrements of status as defined by the estab-
lished bar. On yet another possible measure of professional prominence
and prestige, however, candidates' publication records, there are no ag-
gregate differences between white male and all other appointees.
Examining the litigation experience of the Carter nominees also
reveals a mixed pattern of similarities and differences between white
males and all other designates. No significant differences appeared be-
tween white male and non-traditional nominees in the frequency of
their court appearances; the relative percentages of their federal and
state litigation; and their propensity to choose appellate versus trial and
civil versus criminal cases as the most important legal matters personally
handled. It does appear, however, that non-traditional nominees, par-
ticularly non-whites, were more heavily involved, in the aggregate, in




Significance = 0.02). Similarly, there was a greater likelihood for the
non-traditional candidates to be classified as being engaged in a non-
traditional legal practice on the basis of coding the subject matter of the
ten volunteered case studies (Tau B = -0.14, Significance = 0.03).
Thus, a solid majority (55.7%) of the non-traditional nominees (57.9% of
the non-whites) were classified in this fashion as compared to 40.2% of
the white males (and 41.5% of all whites). The greater likelihood for
non-traditional candidates to engage in non-traditional legal practices
offers additional evidence of the greater diversity and representativeness
brought to the federal bench by the workings of affirmative action in the
judicial recruitment process.
The most dramatic differences between white male and other nomi-
nees on a measure putatively related to professional concerns emerged
on the American Bar Association's ratings of judgeship candidates. It
must be noted, however, that this relationship remains somewhat puz-
zling, troubling, and largely inexplicable in the context of the data ex-
amined throughout this article. Table 7 reveals that under one quarter
(24.7%) of the non-traditional candidates received the two highest ABA
designations while a substantial majority of white males (68.4%) enjoyed
this distinction. Nearly four times as many white males (9.6%) were
designated "exceptionally well qualified" when juxtaposed with non-
whites and females (2.6%). The data are suggestive of a number of pos-
sibilities. For one, it is possible that the ABA ratings reflect a bias in
favor of some of the measures of professional prestige which we have
been viewing (that is, years experience, income, etc.). Conversely, the
ABA focus may work to disadvantage those who have pursued less tradi-
tional paths in their legal careers in terms of the clients they represent
and the types of cases in which they are involved. Another possibility is
simply that the multiple measures utilized here may not tap the same
elements that lead to the ABA rankings. Nevertheless, in view of the
realities of the data viewed there is little evidence, in the aggregate, that
non-traditional nominees have been less qualified to serve on the federal
bench than their white male counterparts. Certainly, given the extreme
differences in ABA ratings received by white male and non-traditional
candidates (which appear equally strong when all whites are compared
to non-whites, and all men to all women), the continued charges of con-
servatism (and sometimes racism and sexism) levelled at the ABA's
Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary, and the importance of the
Committee in the judicial recruitment process, wise counsel suggests the
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need for further analysis of the Committee, its operation, and the corre-
lates of its candidate evaluations.
46
TABLE 7-ABA Rating by Nominee Status(a)
ABA Rating
Exceptionally
Well Qualified Well Qualified Qualified Not Qualified
2 17 56 2
Non-Traditional (2.6%) (22.1%) (72.7%) (2.6%)
Nominee
Status
13 80 42 1
White Male (9.6%) (58.8%) (30.9%) (0.7%)
15 97 98 3
Total (7.0%) (45.5%) (46.0%) (1.4%)
(a) Tau C = -0.41, Significance = 0.00
Some Concluding Thoughts
Much debate has occurred in American society focusing on the legiti-
macy, wisdom, and consequences of affirmative action programs. Par-
ticular emphasis has been placed on the issue of whether added
attentiveness to the demands of one group, by definition, constitutes in-
vidious discrimination against another as well as on the relationship be-
tween affirmative action and merit. Our focus has been on the latter of
these concerns.
For the most part, public dialogue on affirmative action has taken
place at a highly rhetorical and polemical level with little attempt to
generate or utilize empirical evidence. Within the context of judicial
selections during the tenure of the 96th Congress, this article has at-
tempted to set out a data base which might be useful in evaluating one
specific affirmative action program while also serving to help inform
ongoing debates on affirmative action.
Our research has revealed that non-traditional judgeship candidates,
who emerged in large numbers as a consequence of the Carter Adminis-
tration's affirmative action efforts, differed greatly from the traditionally
recruited white males in ways that went well beyond the obvious social
and gender lines. Clearly, affirmative action did not lead to the appoint-
46. For an extensive consideration of the operation of the ABA Committee and an empiri-
cal analysis of its candidate ratings and their correlates, see Slotnick, The ABA Standing Com-




ment of non-whites and females who were the mirror images of the
white males they would sit beside on the bench. Rather, along with
great diversity within their ranks, enhanced gender and racial represen-
tation on the bench added substantially to pluralism in the federal judi-
ciary with increased representation of, among others, the young, the
relatively less affluent, the less politically active, the attorney with non-
traditional and, especially, criminal law practices, and the attorney with
public defender/legal aid backgrounds.
It is not an easy task to measure "quality" among judicial nominees
and, indeed, it is highly unlikely that a consensus could ever be fash-
ioned around the question of what goes into the making of a "good"
judge. We have however, examined white male and all other Carter
nominees on a host of variables, some of which are bound to be an inte-
gral part of any analyst's measure of quality and all of which would
undoubtedly find their way into some analyst's metric. On some such
measures, white male nominees appeared to come out "ahead" of their
non-traditional counterparts. Often, these variables were related to gen-
eral societal norms attached to professional prestige, stature, and suc-
cess. Thus, white male nominees were significantly older, wealthier,
more experienced, more likely to practice before higher level courts, and
more likely to have gained a higher ABA rating than non-traditional
designates. On most of our measures, however, non-traditional nomi-
nees appeared equally qualified or, indeed, fared somewhat "better"
than the white males. Most prominent among these, perhaps, was the
greater propensity for the non-traditional candidate to have gained judi-
cial experience prior to his or her current federal appointment.
Sheldon Goldman has argued that, "in my view the credentials of the
black, women, and Hispanic Carter appointees and nominees have been
impressive. . . . Indeed, it is my distinct impression based on over 16
years of research on the backgrounds of federal judges that the creden-
tials of the women and minorities chosen by the Carter Administration
on the whole may even be more distinguished than the over-all creden-
tials of the white males chosen by Carter and previous administra-
tions."'47 While it is not our intention to argue, in any sense, that the
non-traditional nominees of the Carter administration are objectively
"better" than their white male counterparts, given the data we have
presented it is certainly difficult, if not impossible, to convincingly argue
that the quality of the federal bench has been diluted by affirmative
action. Indeed, on measures ranging from educational training to sev-
eral aspects of legal backgrounds, litigating behavior, and publication
47. Goldman, supra note 3, at 492-93.
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records of the nominees it is impossible to draw meaningful distinctions
between white male and non-traditional nominees that could lead to
assessments of differential quality. Furthermore, there is some evidence
which supports the threshold theory discussed throughout the paper.
That is, perhaps some criteria for the advancement of non-whites and
women are placed at a relatively higher level of attainment before such
individuals are given serious consideration. This appears to be the case
when the questions of prior judicial experience and the most recent em-
ployment of judgeship nominees were considered. Indeed, the data
viewed including, in particular, the ABA ratings of judicial nominees
suggest that the primary issue implicated by the judicial selection pro-
cess during the Carter years was not, necessarily, merit versus affirmative
action. Rather, it appears, the central issue may have been the question
of whose definition of merit would prevail? That is, would selection
outcomes reflect the traditional standards of the established legal (and
governmental) community or, alternatively, would new interests active
in the selection process be successful in imposing their standards of merit
to a greater extent than ever before on recruitment outcomes?
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